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FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LLC MANAGERS:
ARE THEY SUBJECT TO PROSPECTIVE WAIVER UNDER
THE NEW YORK LLC STATUTE?
Jack Graves*
Yelena Davydan**

ABSTRACT:
Fiduciary duties are imposed upon managers of New York
LLCs under both the express provisions of the statute and the
common law supplementing the statute. Less clear is whether such
fiduciary duties may be waived, prospectively, in an LLC operating
agreement under New York law. In Pappas v. Tzolis, the New York
Supreme Court; the Appellate Division, First Department; and,
ultimately, the Court of Appeals, faced a case potentially raising this
question and provided four somewhat different analyses of the range
of possible issues presented (the Appellate Division included both a
majority and dissent). Of most significance for purposes of this
article, some have suggested that the Court of Appeals answered the
question raised herein by holding that fiduciary duties of managers
are indeed subject to contractual waiver under New York law. This
article reaches a contrary conclusion, suggesting that the Court of
Appeals never reached the issue, and further suggesting the
likelihood of a contrary result in the event it may do so in the future.
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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION—DUTIES OF MANAGERS TO
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES

A limited liability company (LLC) is generally run by
“managers” for the benefit of its “member” owners. These managers
may or may not also be members of the LLC. In either event, these
managers, as such, will have certain duties to the LLC based on (1)
contract; (2) statute; and (3) common law. The basic contours of
these duties are generally similar under different state statutes, though
some of the details will vary from state to state. This article will
focus on fiduciary duties of managers under New York LLC Law
and, more importantly, the potential prospective waiver of these
duties.
This introductory Part I will very briefly lay out the basic
duties under New York law. Part II will then address the potential
waiver or elimination of such duties under both New York and
Delaware law. Finally, Part III will analyze a recent New York case
involving an attempted waiver of fiduciary duties and the potential
effectiveness of that waiver under New York and Delaware law,
respectively. This analysis will begin with a guided tour of the case,
as it moved through the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, and Court of Appeals, and will conclude by addressing two
key issues not addressed by the New York Court of Appeals. First,
however, we begin with the basic duties of LLC managers.
A.

Contract Duties

The basic duties of managers to an LLC are typically defined
by contract (much as the basic duties of any agent are defined by
contract with the principal). These “contract” duties are often found
in the operating agreement,1 though they may also be addressed in
other contracts between the LLC and its managers. Each manager is
obligated to comply with his or her contractual duties, unless contrary
to mandatory law governing LLCs. To the extent that such duties are
not defined by contract, they may be defined by reference to the
default provisions of the governing law, as found in the LLC statute
or supplemented by common law.

1

See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417 (McKinney 1996).
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Statutory Duties and Limitations

Managers of an LLC are required to perform their duties, as
such, “in good faith and with that degree of care that an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances.”2 This duty of care is often broken down into
“substance” and “process,” with managers generally afforded the
substantial deference of the “business judgment rule” in the absence
of any defect in their decision-making process.
Moreover, transactions between the manager and the LLC in
which the manager is deemed personally “interested” are statutorily
“limited” in that they must be specially approved in accordance with
the statute.3 The statute thereby seeks a balance between concerns on
one hand over transactions in which a manager may have split
loyalties and potentially significant benefits to the LLC on the other
that may arise from a transaction, even though a manager has
potentially competing financial interests.
While a duty of “loyalty” is, to some degree, inherent in
NYLLCL § 411, referenced in the previous paragraph, the statute
does not expressly address any duty of loyalty in the context of
potential competition with (as opposed to contracting with) the LLC.
This aspect of the duty of loyalty might be “implied” from the
language of NYLLC § 409(a) requiring “good faith,” but is more
often said to be derived from the common law.
C.

Common Law Duties and Limitations

A common law fiduciary duty of loyalty is generally imposed
on all corporate directors and LLC managers, even in the absence of
any specific statutory provision addressing the issue. The roots of
such duty are often traced to Judge Cardozo’s seminal opinion in
Meinhard v. Salmon,4 which describes the nature of this duty as
follows:
[Partners] owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. . . . A trustee
is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
2
3
4

Id. § 409(a).
See id. § 411.
164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the ‘disintegrating erosion’ of particular
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be
lowered by any judgment of this court.5
Judge Cardozo noted the potential for waiver of such a duty with
proper notice of a specific opportunity at the time it arose, but
declined to opine on the effectiveness of such a waiver.6 It is hard to
imagine that the court would have countenanced a prospective waiver
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty—in effect, a “blank check” without
limits on its nature or amount.
Strictly speaking, Meinhard v. Salmon was a partnership case.
However, its language and logic have been extended beyond the
partnership context7 to stand for a fiduciary duty of loyalty to a
common enterprise that generally precludes individual pursuit of
financial opportunities reasonably related and available to the
common enterprise. The general imposition of a duty of loyalty that
restricts usurpation of a corporate opportunity or competition with the
corporation is broadly accepted, though its precise contours may
remain subject to some variation and debate. What is far less clear is
whether such a duty may be waived prospectively, effectively
allowing individuals managing a common enterprise to compete,
simultaneously, with each other and with the enterprise itself, without
breaching any duty to the common enterprise.

5

Id. at 546 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 547.
7
See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander of N.Y., Inc. v. Fritzen, 542 N.Y.S.2d 530, 534-35
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (applied to a New York corporation); cf. Tzolis v. Wolff, 884
N.E.2d 1005 (N.Y. 2008) (relying on a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty of those in
control of an LLC in implying the right of plaintiffs to bring a derivative action in response
to such breach).
6
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WAIVER OR ELIMINATION OF LIABILITY OF DUTIES OF
MANAGERS TO A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

One might reasonably begin by asking why a group of
individuals engaged in a common enterprise would ever wish to
waive or eliminate duties of the individuals to act loyally for the
benefit of that common enterprise. However, enterprises take many
forms, and a group of individuals may be more interested,
prospectively, in litigation avoidance than in imposing limitations or
restrictions on the actions of those responsible for the common
enterprise. Part II begins with two exemplary cases—one in a
partnership context8 (decided under Oklahoma law) and one in an
LLC context9 (decided under Ohio law) and then moves to examine
the New York and Delaware statutes addressing the same basic issue
in the context of an LLC. A thorough examination of the nature and
extent of the applicable New York LLC statute further requires us to
look more fully at its origin in the New York Business Corporation
law. With this understanding of the relevant New York and
Delaware statutes in hand, we can then be ready to move on to
consider the case at issue in Part III.
A.

Prospective Contractual Waivers or Elimination of
the Basic Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty—Two
Exemplary Cases

An Oklahoma oil and gas partnership agreement expressly
allowed partners to engage in competitive oil and gas transactions for
their own individual accounts, even where such transactions might
directly and negatively affect the financial interests of the
partnership.10 The contract clause allowing for such conduct
provided as follows:
Each partner shall be free to enter into business and
other transactions for his or her own separate
individual account, even though such business or other
transaction may be in conflict with and/or competition
with the business of this partnership. Neither the
partnership nor any individual member of this
8
9
10

See infra note 10.
See infra note 16.
Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 768 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981).
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partnership shall be entitled to claim or receive any
part of or interest in such transactions, it being the
intention and agreement that any partner will be free
to deal on his or her own account to the same extent
and with the same force and effect as if he or she were
not and never had been members of this partnership.11
Two of the partners individually acquired oil and gas rights in which
their broader partnership had also shown an interest in acquiring.12
When the partnership sought to impose a constructive trust, the court
rejected the claim by reference to the contractual provision quoted
above.13 The court noted and gave effect to the clear language
allowing “spirited, if not outright predatory competition between the
partners” even to the extent “as if there never had been a
partnership.”14 While noting typical fiduciary obligations arising in
the context of a partnership, the court gave effect to the parties’
agreement in waiving liability for any actions short of individual
partners stealing or otherwise misusing “existing” partnership
assets.15
A group of investors hoping to secure and operate an NHL
professional hockey franchise formed an LLC expressly for that
purpose.16 Within the same time frame, Hunt, a managing member of
that LLC, sought and successfully secured for his own personal
benefit the same franchise sought by the LLC.17 In a legal action to
determine whether Hunt’s actions had violated any fiduciary duty to
his co-venturers in the LLC, the court ruled that he had not by relying
on the following provision in the LLC operating agreement:
Members May Compete. Members shall not in any
way be prohibited from or restricted in engaging or
owning an interest in any other business venture of
any nature, including any venture which might be
competitive with the business of the Company.18

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id. at 768-69.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 772.
Singer, 634 P.2d at 772-73.
McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 1193, 1200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1206.
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In each of these two cases, a group of co-venturers sought to limit,
and perhaps even eliminate, fiduciary obligations to their coventurers, allowing for, as the Singer court expressed “spirited, if not
outright predatory competition between the partners.”19 Moreover,
the seemingly broad and unequivocal language suggests a strong
intent by the parties to avoid exactly the sort of litigation that
ultimately transpired. The question is whether such a prospective
waiver should be enforceable. The two courts above said yes.20
However, individual state laws governing LLCs differ. In this article,
we will initially examine the laws of both Delaware and New York,
which provide for useful comparative analysis. However, we will
ultimately focus on the law of New York, as applied to this question.
B.

Statutory Provisions Addressing Waiver or
Elimination of the Basic Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
under Delaware and New York Law

The statutory duties of managers to an LLC are of course
subject to waiver or elimination only to the extent allowed by
statute.21 Common law duties, such as the fiduciary duty of loyalty,
might, at least in theory, be subject to waiver or elimination under the
common law as well. However, there is little precedent allowing for
prospective waiver of a common law fiduciary duty of loyalty (the
Oklahoma case above being relatively unique), and the authors are
aware of no such New York case. In fact, such a prospective waiver
is arguably inconsistent with the very nature of the fiduciary
relationship described by the New York Court of Appeals in
Meinhard v. Salmon.22 Thus, any right to waive or eliminate the
basic fiduciary duty—including the common law duty of loyalty—
must likely be found in an applicable statute. We now turn our
attention to the relevant Delaware and New York statutes, which
present a rather stark contrast.
19

Singer, 634 P.2d at 772.
See id. at 772 (holding that the agreement was “designed to allow and was uniquely
drafted to promote spirited, if not outright predatory competition between the partners”). See
also McConnell, 725 N.E.2d at 1222 (finding that the partner’s actions “were in no way
impermissible under the operating agreement”).
21
See supra note 1. Some statutory duties may be mandatory, while others may be
subject to waiver or modification by agreement, provided any statutory requirements for
such waiver or modification are met.
22
See discussion supra Part I.C.
20
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The Delaware Statute

The Delaware statute is unique to Limited Liability Company
law and expressly seeks “to give maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements,”23 even where such freedom may go beyond
traditional common law doctrine, such as that imposing a duty of
loyalty on managers.24 The statute expressly allows for contractual
modification or elimination of the duties of an LLC member or
manager (including any fiduciary duties), with the sole limitation
“that the limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”25 In
short, the only limitation under the Delaware statute on the parties’
right to eliminate fiduciary duties by contract is, itself, grounded in
the common law of contract. The duty of good faith, as a matter of
contract law, is a mandatory rule and is not subject to waiver by the
parties. The Delaware LLC statute merely reiterates that common
law rule.26 However, any fiduciary duty arising from the unique
nature of a manager’s role in an LLC is fully subject to prospective
waiver under Delaware law.27
2.

The New York Statute

In contrast to Delaware’s use of a unique statutory provision
crafted specifically for LLCs, the only New York LLC provision
addressing waiver of duties of a manager to an LLC or its members is
taken almost verbatim from the New York Business Corporation
Law.28 This statutory provision begins by broadly allowing for the
inclusion within the LLC operating agreement of a contractual
“provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of managers
to the limited liability company or its members for damages for any

23

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §18-1101(b) (West 2013).
Id. § 18-1101(a).
25
Id. § 18-1101(c) (emphasis added); see also id. § 18-1101(d)-(j) (further elaborating on
the broad deference to contract under the statute).
26
See id. § 18-1101(c).
27
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §18-1101(c).
28
See generally N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a)(1) (the LLC provision allowing for
elimination or limitation of personal liability of managers) and N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §
402(b)(1) (McKinney 1998) (the provision in the Business Corporation Law allowing for
elimination or limitation of personal liability of directors).
24
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breach of duty in such capacity . . . .”29 However, this broad grant is
then substantially limited to preclude elimination or limitation of
liability where, inter alia, the manager’s “acts or omissions were in
bad faith or involved intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law” or the manager “personally gained in fact a financial profit
or other advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled.”30
This substantial limiting language appears to provide for a far
narrower range of application than the Delaware statute above, in
effect, allowing the parties far less autonomy in limiting or
eliminating the duties of managers or liability for any breach thereof.
In Pappas v. Tzolis,31 addressed in Part III, none of the courts
directly address NYLLCL § 417(a), even though the supreme court
decision directly addresses the effectiveness of a prospective waiver
of fiduciary duty, which would seem to fall directly within the scope
of the statutory language. As further explained in Part III, the Court
of Appeals avoided any decision as to the effectiveness of the
prospective waiver. However, our own “hypothetical” exploration of
this issue requires us to consider the statute and its history in some
detail.
a.

The Genesis of NYBCL § 402(b)—
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Duty of
Corporate Directors to Inform
Themselves

The evolutionary history of NYLLCL § 417(a) begins with a
case involving the duties of corporate directors to take reasonable
steps to inform themselves before taking action on behalf of the
corporation. In New York, this duty is found in NYBCL § 717(a)
and the duty of directors to act “with that degree of care which an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances”—often called the “duty of care.”32 Similar duties
were historically imposed under most corporation laws, including
Delaware. Significantly, the inquiry was typically very fact specific,
with significant deference to the directors in balancing the need for
prompt action with the need for more information, consistent with the
29
30
31
32

N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a).
Id. § 417(a)(1) (emphasis added).
982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012).
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(a).
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business judgment rule. That all changed when the Delaware
Supreme Court handed down its controversial decision in Smith v.
Van Gorkom.33
i.

The Basic Conundrum of
Smith v. Van Gorkom

In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the board of directors of Trans
Union Corporation had made a decision to sell the business in its
entirety.34 The selling price was significantly higher than the market
price at which the company’s shares were trading at the time.35
However, the negotiations occurred between a small group over a
compressed period of time, and the board decision happened very
quickly.36 The case represented the classic challenge in which the
directors were required to balance the need for prompt action with the
potential that they might learn more with further analysis and
deliberation.37 The directors opted in favor of moving quickly (a
view supported by counsel, who suggested they might get sued if
they did not accept the offer then on the table), likely confident that
their decision would be protected by the business judgment rule.38
However, the Delaware Supreme Court thought otherwise.39
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors of Trans
Union were not, in this case, entitled to the benefit of the business
judgment rule, because they had failed to exercise due care in
informing themselves.40 Thus, all were exposed to personal liability
to the extent of any determination that Trans Union had been sold for
less than fair value.41 The corporate response was swift and
overwhelmingly critical. Insurance premiums for directors and
officers skyrocketed, and boards became far more fearful of quick
decision-making, without exhaustive analysis (which may or may not
be a good thing, depending on the circumstances).42 The legislative
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 865.
Id. at 865-68.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 880.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 893.
Lynn A. Howell, Post Smith v. Van Gorkom Director Liability Legislation with a
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responses were also swift.
ii.

The Common Statutory
Solution to this Conundrum

In Delaware, the legislature enacted and the Governor signed,
on June 18, 1986, Title 8 §102(b)(7),43 essentially allowing for
limitation or elimination of liability arising from a director’s duty of
care, but precluding any such waiver of a director’s duty of good
faith, loyalty, or improper self-dealing.44 The vast majority of
Delaware corporations promptly took advantage of §102(b)(7). A
majority of other states quickly followed suit,45 including New York,
which, in 1987, enacted New York Business Corporations Law §
402(b).46
Significantly, however, neither the Delaware nor the New
York legislative response to Smith v. Van Gorkom in any way
provided for prospective waiver of director liability for a breach of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty or for improper self-dealing. As
indicated in Part II.B.1 above, Delaware has independently taken this
latter step with respect to LLC managers.47 New York, however, has
taken a very different approach.

Proactive Perspective, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 564-68 (1988).
43
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (West 2013).
44
Howell, supra note 42, at 568-69.
45
Id. at 569.
46
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney 2015):
The certificate of incorporation may set forth a provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of directors to the corporation or its
shareholders for damages for any breach of duty in such capacity,
provided that no such provision shall eliminate or limit: (1) the liability
of any director if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to him
establishes that his acts or omissions were in bad faith or involved
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law or that he
personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which
he was not legally entitled or that his acts violated section 719, or (2) the
liability of any director for any act or omission prior to the adoption of a
provision authorized by this paragraph.
Id.
47
See supra notes 24-28.
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Transporting the Statutory Response
to Smith v. Van Gorkom to an LLC
Statute

In enacting its LLC statute in 1994 (post Smith v. Van
Gorkom), the legislature largely copied and pasted the language of
New York Business Corporations Law § 402(b)(1) into New York
Limited Liability Company Law § 417(a)(1).48 The statutory
provisions (contained in footnotes below) are easily compared, and
the changes are limited as follows: (1) corporation is changed to
limited liability company; (2) directors are changed to managers; (3)
shareholders are changed to members; (4) female pronouns are added
to male pronouns; and (5) certain LLC statutory provisions are
substituted for comparable New York Business Corporations Law
statutory provisions regarding certain specific director liability.49
None of the above changes address the basic effect of the statute, and
none in any way change the effectiveness of any waiver of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty of a director or manager, respectively. Thus,
one can reasonably infer that the legislature’s intent in transporting
the language of New York Business Corporations Law § 402(b)(1)
into New York Limited Liability Company Law § 417(a)(1) was
simply to allow the members of an LLC to address the concerns
raised by Smith v. Van Gorkom and limit or eliminate any liability for
failing to inform themselves adequately before making a decision—
but certainly not to allow for a waiver of a manager’s fiduciary duty
of loyalty.
48

N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a):
The operating agreement may set forth a provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of managers to the limited liability
company or its members for damages for any breach of duty in such
capacity, provided that no such provision shall eliminate or limit: (1) the
liability of any manager if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse
to him or her establishes that his or her acts or omissions were in bad
faith or involved intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law or
that he or she personally gained in fact a financial profit or other
advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled or that with respect
to a distribution the subject of subdivision (a) of section five hundred
eight of this chapter his or her acts were not performed in accordance
with section four hundred nine of this article; or (2) the liability of any
manager for any act or omission prior to the adoption of a provision
authorized by this subdivision.

Id.
49

See supra notes 46 and 48.
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PAPPAS V. TZOLIS—WHAT THE NEW YORK COURT OF
APPEALS DID AND DID NOT SAY

In Pappas v. Tzolis,50 the Court of Appeals had an opportunity
to discuss the issue of prospective waiver of fiduciary duties under
New York law. Instead, however, the Court of Appeals grounded its
decision entirely in a subsequent “Certificate” executed by the parties
in which any existing claims for breach of any fiduciary duties were
expressly released, and any then-existing fiduciary duties were
expressly disclaimed.51 The path of this litigation through the New
York Supreme Court, the Appellate Division, and Court of Appeals is
outlined below, after which we return to the questions that were not
answered by the Court of Appeals—including the question of
whether a prospective waiver is effective in limiting or eliminating
the fiduciary duties of managers of an LLC under New York law.
A.

The Facts of the Case

Steve Tzolis and plaintiffs formed Vrahos LLC for the
purpose of leasing a building in Manhattan.52 The lease commenced
in January 2006 and required payment by the LLC of a security
deposit of $1,192,500, along with personal guarantees from Tzolis
and plaintiff Steve Pappas as to payment of ongoing rent by the
LLC.53 The LLC operating agreement specified that Tzolis would
personally advance the security deposit on behalf of the LLC and
provided that, as consideration for advancing the security deposit,
Tzolis would have certain specified rights to enter into a sublease of
the property from the LLC.54 Under such sublease, Tzolis would pay
additional monies to the LLC above the rental payments that the LLC
was required to pay directly to the landlord.55 Tzolis soon exercised
his right to sublease the building.56
By late 2006, however, a variety of issues had arisen between
Tzolis and the others, leading Tzolis to suggest that he acquire their

50
51
52
53
54
55
56

982 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 578-80.
Pappas v. Tzolis, 932 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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interests in the LLC.57 Plaintiffs agreed and negotiated buyouts of
$1,000,000 for plaintiff Pappas and $500,000 for plaintiff
Ifantopoulos (for which they had originally paid $50,000 and
$25,000, respectively), which were completed by early 2007.58 The
agreements between plaintiffs and Tzolis were accompanied by a
signed, handwritten “Certificate,” which provided, in pertinent part,
that:
[E]ach of the undersigned Sellers, in connection with
their respective assignments to Steve Tzolis of their
membership interests in Vrahos LLC, has performed
their own due diligence in connection with such
assignments. Each of the undersigned Sellers has
engaged its own legal counsel, and is not relying on
any representation by Steve Tzolis or any of his agents
or representatives, except as set forth in the
assignments & other documents delivered to the
undersigned Sellers today. Further, each of the
undersigned Sellers agrees that Steve Tzolis has no
fiduciary duty to the undersigned Sellers in connection
with such assignments.59
Six months after the assignment of plaintiffs’ interest to Tzolis,
Vrahos LLC, now wholly owned by Tzolis, assigned its lease to
nonparty Charlton Soho LLC for $17.5 million.60 In the ensuing
legal action, Pappas asserted that he later discovered (unbeknownst to
plaintiffs at the time) that Tzolis had begun negotiating the
assignment of the lease to nonparty Extell Development Company,
Charlton’s owner, a number of months before plaintiffs assigned their
interests in the LLC to Tzolis.61
The above referenced LLC Operating Agreement also
contained the following potentially relevant provision:
Any Member may engage in business ventures and
investments of any nature whatsoever, whether or not
in competition with the LLC, without obligation of

57
58
59
60
61

Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
Id. at 442-43; Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 578.
Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
Id.
Id.
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any kind to the LLC or to the other Members.62
Vrahos LLC was organized as a Delaware limited liability company
under Delaware LLC law. However, the Operating Agreement
included a choice of law provision63 expressly providing that the
agreement was governed by New York law. 64
In short, Tzolis had purchased the interests of his co-venturers
in the LLC for an amount equal to roughly twenty times their original
investment.65 However, Tzolis had, a relatively short time later,
resold those same interests (along with his own original interest) at an
even greater profit (valuing the LLC at roughly seven times what
Tzolis paid in buying out the other LLC members), to the exclusion
of his original co-venturers.66 Moreover, Tzolis had allegedly begun
negotiating the ultimate sale while still engaged in the original coventure with plaintiffs.67 Assuming these facts to be true, Tzolis
might have raised two potentially distinct defenses: (1) the Operating
Agreement provision purporting to allow “competition with the LLC”
(and perhaps waiving any fiduciary duty to his co-venturers in the
LLC); and (2) the provision of the “Certificate” purporting to
disclaim or waive any fiduciary duty in connection with the
assignment to Tzolis of plaintiffs’ interests in the LLC. This
distinction is important in considering the decisions of each of the
New York courts addressing plaintiffs’ claims.
B.

The Decision of the Supreme Court

Plaintiffs brought various claims against Tzolis, including a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and Tzolis moved to dismiss.68
On the motion, the parties disagreed as to the governing law, with
Tzolis arguing Delaware law and plaintiffs insisting on New York

62

See infra note 72.
In most cases, the inclusion in any agreement of an express choice of law provision will
add a degree of certainty to the resolution of any subsequent question or dispute. However,
the inclusion in an LLC operating agreement of any such choice other than the state of
organization would seemingly only inject uncertainty based on the inherent conflict between
the near universally embraced “internal affairs doctrine,” and the parties’ express choice.
64
Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
65
Id. at 447.
66
Id. at 443.
67
Id.
68
Id.
63
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law.69 The Supreme Court sided with Tzolis on the merits, but
avoided the complex choice of law issue by deciding that both
Delaware and New York law rendered the same result.70
In dismissing the breach of fiduciary claim, the Supreme
Court relied on the above-referenced provision of the Operating
Agreement that allowed members to “engage in business ventures
and investments of any nature whatsoever, whether or not in
competition with the LLC, without obligation of any kind to the LLC
or to the other Members.”71 The court held that this provision
effectively eliminated the members’ respective fiduciary duties to
each other under both New York and Delaware law “from the start of
the LLC.”72 The Delaware LLC statute,73 as the Supreme Court
explained, allowed such prospective waiver in LLC operating
agreements, with the exception of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied as a matter of basic contract law.74 The court further
concluded that the parties’ contract to have no fiduciary duties to
each other and to the LLC was lawful under New York law and did
not violate its public policy.75 As such, plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary
duty claim failed under both Delaware and New York law based on
the prospective waiver of such duties in the Operating Agreement.76
Significantly, however, the court’s analysis of the Operating
Agreement under New York law failed to cite any statutory authority
or even mention § 417 of NYLLCL. Instead, the court grounded its
conclusion upon the broad principle of freedom of contract, ignoring
a potentially significant limitation imposed by the applicable New
York LLC statute.
C.

The Decision of the Appellate Division

The Appellate Division took a different approach. Seemingly
assuming that Delaware law governed,77 the appellate court explained
69

Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
Id. at 444.
71
Id. at 442.
72
Pappas v. Tzolis, No. 601115/09, 2010 WL 8367478, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3,
2010).
73
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (West 2013).
74
Pappas, 2010 WL 8367478, at *3.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 445. While the case was in the Appellate Division, plaintiffs
70
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that while permitting prospective waiver of fiduciary duties,
Delaware law required such waiver to be “explicit.”78 In the court’s
view, Tzolis did not establish that the subject provision of the
Operating Agreement “explicitly” waived all traditional fiduciary
duties as required by Delaware law.79 Hence, at the time of the buyout transaction, Tzolis still owed some fiduciary duty to plaintiffs,
and the Certificate, purportedly releasing him from any liability
arising from his fiduciary duties, moved front and center as the focus
of the court’s analysis.80
In the Certificate, executed as part of the New York buy-out
transaction (and therefore governed by New York law), plaintiffs
expressly acknowledged that Tzolis owed them no fiduciary duty.
But, the court invalidated this purported disclaimer relying on New
York law.81 The Appellate Division held that Tzolis had “an
overriding duty to disclose his dealings with Extell to plaintiffs
before they assigned their interests in Vrahos to him”82 because the
relationship of trust still existed between the members at the time of
the assignment of plaintiffs’ interest.83
The dissent seemingly agreed that the language of the
Operating Agreement was insufficient to provide an effective
prospective waiver of all fiduciary duties under Delaware law.84
However, the dissenting judges concluded that under New York law85
the Certificate discharged Tzolis from any liability arising from his

continued to argue that New York law applied based on the choice of law clause in the
Operating Agreement. The appellate court’s decision on Tzolis’ prospective waiver
argument is based solely on Delaware law, with no choice of law analysis and no analysis of
the New York LLC statute.
78
Id. (citing Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2010)).
79
Id.
80
Notably, Tzolis’ argument was based on the waiver provision in the Operating
Agreement, rather than on the Certificate. As suggested by the decision of the Supreme
Court, Tzolis contended that the Certificate merely corroborated the parties’ intent to
disclaim all fiduciary duties. Id.
81
Id. at 445 (relying primarily on Blue Chip Emerald v. Allied Partners, 750 N.Y.S.2d
291 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002)).
82
Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
83
Id. at 445.
84
Id. at 449.
85
Id. at 450 (Freedman, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on Centro Empresarial
Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 952 N.E.2d 995, 1001 (N.Y. 2011), a case
that criticized the Appellate Division’s decision in Blue Chip Emerald and upheld the
parties’ right to release each other from claims arising out of fiduciary duties.
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fiduciary duties.86 In effect, the dissent presented a new theory,
which Tzolis had not argued either in the court below or on appeal,
laying ground for the Court of Appeals’ review. While the Appellate
Division reinstated the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim, it
shifted the focus of the dispute from the validity of the prospective
waiver provision in the Operating Agreement to the effect of the
purported release in the Certificate.87
D.

A Rather Ordinary Decision by the Court of
Appeals

The decision of the Court of Appeals does not discuss the
Operating Agreement or the parties’ purported prospective waiver of
fiduciary duties at all. Rather, it deals with one and only one issue
with respect to plaintiffs’ claim of breach of fiduciary duty—whether
the Certificate effectively released Tzolis from any such claim.
The Court’s prior precedent established that a principal could
release its fiduciary from claims where “the fiduciary relationship is
no longer one of unquestioning trust.”88 Applying this principle to
the specific circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals held that
the release in the Certificate was valid because at the time of the buyout the parties’ relationship had already deteriorated and plaintiffs
could not reasonably rely on Tzolis as their fiduciary.89
While Tzolis ultimately prevailed, his victory at the Court of
Appeals rested on a different ground than at the trial court. The
Supreme Court found that the parties prospectively waived their
respective fiduciary duties to each other by means of the provision in
the Operating Agreement.90 The Appellate Division found that the
Operating Agreement did not provide a valid prospective waiver of
all traditional fiduciary duties and moved the inquiry to the
Certificate.91 The Court of Appeals did not even consider the
Operating Agreement, but based its decision on the release of claims
arising out of Tzolis’ fiduciary duties provided at the time of the buyout transaction by means of the Certificate.92
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
Id. at 445.
Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 579 (citing Centro, 952 N.E.2d at 1001).
Id.
Pappas, 2010 WL 8367478.
Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 580.
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One might reasonably infer that the Court consciously
avoided the Operating Agreement knowing that it required potentially
challenging statutory interpretation. Even if the Court agreed with
the Appellate Division, that the Operating Agreement did not
effectively waive all traditional fiduciary duties, it could have still
addressed the effectiveness of the waiver even if limited. A
prospective waiver of any fiduciary duties would have further
suggested the lack of such duties, generally, at the time the
Certificate was executed.93 The Certificate clearly presented an
easier path to find for Tzolis and uphold the parties’ choice to
eliminate fiduciary duties. In taking this path, however, the Court
chose to forego an opportunity to buttress its decision by pointing out
that even a partial waiver in the Operating Agreement, as Tzolis
argued, helped to further establish the effectiveness of the Certificate
at the time of the buy-out transaction. While the Court’s intent will
ultimately remain unknown, the fact remains that the Court of
Appeals never discussed: (1) which law governed this prospective
attempt to waive fiduciary duties in the Operating Agreement, or (2)
whether such a prospective waiver was valid.
1.

Misinterpreting the Decision of the Court of
Appeals

Nonetheless, a number of commentators seemingly
misinterpret Pappas to suggest that the case established LLC
members’ rights to prospectively waive fiduciary duties under New
York law. For example, one commentator wrote that “[f]ollowing the
decision in Pappas, it can be said with a high degree of certainty that
New York indeed permits the complete waiver of LLC member
fiduciary duty via contract (but still subject to the limitations of
Section 417 of the NY LLC Law).”94
Similarly, another
commentator also discussed the decision in Pappas in connection
with § 417 of New York LLC statute and stated that the Court
93
Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 450. Consistent with the dissenting opinion of the Appellate
Division, the focus of Tzolis’ argument at the Court of Appeals shifted from the Operating
Agreement to the Certificate. Nevertheless, the questions presented to the Court of Appeals
by Tzolis’ brief invited the Court to weigh in on the effect of the waiver provision in the
Operating Agreement, as it related to the effectiveness of the Certificate.
94
Limiting Fiduciary Duty in New York Entities for Private Placement Offerings, RAISING
CAPITAL (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.regd-ppm-lawyers.com/limiting-fiduciary-duty-newyork-entities-private-placement-offerings/.
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“enforced a contractual waiver of fiduciary duties among LLC
members.”95 Commentators further discussed Pappas in the context
of prospective waivers of fiduciary duties, such as those allowed by §
18-1101 of the Delaware LLC statute.96 Another author seemingly
concluded that Pappas “permitted waivers of fiduciary duties owed
to LLC members” based on multiple factors, including the
antagonistic relationship of sophisticated LLC members, the LLC
agreement permitting competing business ventures, and the
Certificate releasing Tzolis from his fiduciary duties.97
The aforementioned comments on Pappas seem to conflate
the notion of an ex ante prospective waiver of all fiduciary duties,
governed by § 417 of NYLLCL, and an ex post release of an existing
known right. While the Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the
latter under the circumstances presented in Pappas, it never even
discussed the former under either Delaware or New York law. The
distinction is important.
A prospective waiver is a decision by LLC co-venturers to do
business owing no fiduciary duties to each other or the LLC from the
very start of their business venture. Section 417 of NYLLCL affirms
their right to waive certain duties in the LLC operating agreement,
but imposes significant limitations on such waivers. The Certificate
reviewed by the Court of Appeals in Pappas was not a blanket
prospective waiver of fiduciary duties and, therefore, did not invoke §
417 of NYLLCL. Rather, it represented plaintiffs’ release of their
known (or knowable) right to a claim against Tzolis in the context of
a buy-out transaction. The validity of such a release depended, as the
Court of Appeals explained, on the particular circumstances of the
buy-out transaction and the nature of the parties’ relationship at the
time of that transaction. Thus, contrary to the assertions of some
commentators, Pappas provided no insights on the contours of New
95

Arina Shulga, Part III: Fiduciary Duties of LLC Managers in New York, Delaware, and
Other States, BUS. LAW POST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.businesslawpost.com/2013/11/
part-iii-fiduciary-duties-of-llc.html.
96
Zachary G. Newman & Alison M.C. Schrag, The Enforceability of Fiduciary Duty
Waivers, 14 COM. & BUS. LITIG. 3 (2013), available at: http://www.hahnhessen.com/
uploads/1065/doc/2013_06_zgn_amc_fiduciary_duty_waivers.pdf ; Vincent Syracuse, Paul
Sarkozi, Jamie Stecher & Zev Raben, Litigation: Can LLC Members Effectively Waive Their
Fiduciary Duties?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/
02/14/litigation-can-llc-members-effectively-waive-their.
97
Helen (Wendy) J. Williamson & Andrew M. Walsh, New Jersey Eases Fiduciary
Duties for LLCs, ANDERSON KILL & OLICK, P.C. (Jan. 2013), http://www.andersonkill.com/
webpdfext/publications/csu/pdf/New_Jersey_Eases_Fiduciary_Duties_For_LLCs.pdf.
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York law on the issue of prospective waiver of fiduciary duties in the
context of an LLC. By focusing on the release in the Certificate the
Court of Appeals avoided reviewing the Operating Agreement, a task
that would probably require a choice of law analysis, and potentially
commentary on § 417 of NYLLCL.
2.

The Issues Not Decided

The Court of Appeals, in Pappas, re-iterated that LLC
members may release claims arising out of their respective fiduciary
duties.98 But, the high Court did not address, arguably, the most
interesting and challenging issues that the case presented at the outset
of the litigation. First, the parties disagreed on the governing law,
with respect to the Operating Agreement. Nonetheless, neither court
engaged in a choice of law analysis, although the Appellate Division
seemingly decided that Delaware law governed without any
explanation. Second, the Court of Appeals never reviewed the
validity of the waiver provision in the Operating Agreement under §
417 of NYLLCL. The discussion below focuses on these issues
suggesting that the choice of law clause as well as a prospective
waiver of a duty of loyalty clause is likely ineffective under the
NYLLCL.
a.

Choosing Law to Govern an LLC
Operating Agreement

While the Vrahos LLC was organized under the Delaware
law, its members chose New York law in their Operating
Agreement.99 It is hard to fathom any rational basis for choosing to
form an LLC in Delaware and then seeking to subject the Operating
Agreement and internal affairs of that LLC to New York (or any state
other than Delaware) law. At a minimum, such approach creates
uncertainty as to the governing law. That said, it does present an
interesting choice of law question.
A strict application of the relevant statute suggests that the
choice of law provision in Vrahos’s Operating Agreement was likely
ineffective. Section 801(a) of NYLLCL provides:
Subject to the constitution of this state: (a) the laws of
98
99

Pappas, 982 N.E.2d at 580.
Pappas, 932 N.Y.S.2d at 442.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss3/11

22

Graves and Davydan: Fiduciary Duties of LLC Managers

2015

FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LLC MANAGERS

461

the jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability
company is formed govern the organization and
internal affairs and the liability of its members and
managers; . . .100
Based on the statutory language, this provision appears to be a
mandatory rather than a default rule. The default provisions of the
NYLLCL allow the parties to contract for a different result by
indicating that they are subject to the parties’ Operating Agreement
or the LLC’s Articles of Organization.101 Section 801, however, is
subject only to the New York Constitution, without any suggestion of
the parties’ right to contract for a different result in the Operating
Agreement or otherwise. Hence, unlike the default provisions of the
NYLLCL, the legislature chose to limit the choice of law provided in
§ 801 only by the state’s constitution—and not to provide the parties
with a right to contract otherwise. The statutory language, when
strictly applied, renders the parties’ purported choice of New York
law in Vrahos’s Operating Agreement ineffective.
However, the Court of Appeals does not always engage in a
strict application of the statutory language,102 and we found no
reported appellate decisions reviewing a choice of law clause vis-àvis § 801. Given that an LLC, as a form of business organization, is
supposed to provide the parties with the most freedom to define the
governance of their business through contract, one might reasonably
expect the Court of Appeals to imply the parties’ right to deviate
from the statute if and when it is faced with this issue.
b.

Prospective Waiver of a Manager’s
Duty of Loyalty to an LLC

To the extent the parties’ choice of New York law is upheld,
the wisdom of such choice with respect to the parties’ intent to
prospectively waive a managers’ duty of loyalty is questionable at
best. A foreign LLC whose members for whatever reason effectively
subjected the LLC Operating Agreement to New York law, as well as
a domestic New York LLC, is subject to the limitations set forth in §
100

N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 801(a).
See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 406, 407, 414, 420, 603 etc.
102
See, e.g., Tzolis v. Wolff, 884 N.E.2d 1005 (N.Y. 2008) (in a four to three decision,
finding a right to bring a derivative action where the legislature clearly did not provide for
one in the statute).
101
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417(a)(1) of NYLLCL.103 The scope of these limitations, as currently
written, most likely renders any waiver of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty, such as the one attempted in Vrahos’s Operating Agreement,
ineffective.
While LLC members may limit or eliminate manager’s
personal liability to the members of the LLC under New York law,104
section 417(a)(1) prohibits the managers, inter alia, from personally
gaining “in fact a financial profit or other advantage to which he or
she was not legally entitled.”105 In effect, this limitation excludes the
duty of loyalty, and potentially other duties, from the universe of
waivable duties. However, the question of whether Tzolis was
“legally entitled” to the financial profit at issue presents a classic
problem of circularity. One may argue that Tzolis was “legally
entitled” to act as he did by virtue of the waiver provision in the
Operating Agreement. But, such interpretation would effectively
swallow the limitation in its entirety by “legalizing” any conduct
through a contractual waiver.
The Court of Appeals has yet to explain its understanding of
the statutory language. In the meantime it appears that the statutory
limitations, absent some creative interpretation, invalidate any
prospective attempt by the members to waive the managers’ duty of
loyalty.106 Moreover, the legislative history of NYLLCL § 417(a)(1)
strongly suggests that this statutory provision was never intended to
be read so broadly as to allow the members of an LLC to limit or
eliminate prospectively the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
New York’s LLC statute vests members with the right to
prospectively limit or eliminate managers’ liability, but does not
appear to provide any basis for upholding the members’ attempt to
prospectively waive any fiduciary duties. To the extent members of a
Delaware LLC seek to prospectively eliminate all fiduciary duties,
they would be ill-advised to attempt a choice of New York law in the
LLC’s operating agreement given these New York statutory
limitations. At best, such choice, if valid, would leave them with
uncertainty as to the effectiveness of their agreement to proceed
103

See N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a).
N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a).
105
Id. § 417(a)(1).
106
As discussed above, in New York the duty of loyalty is established by common law
rather than the statute. One may reasonably question whether the statute preempts common
law on the issue of prospective waiver. This article, however, does not attempt to address
this potentially complex question.
104
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assuming no loyalty to each other or their enterprise.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this article, we take the position that a manager’s fiduciary
duty of loyalty to an LLC is not subject to prospective waiver under
current New York law. However, this perhaps begs the more
interesting question on this 20th anniversary of the enactment of New
York’s LLC law—should the law allow for and give full effect to
such a waiver if clear and unequivocal? Should New York follow the
approach of Delaware, or should it continue to hew closely to the
path originally charted by Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon?
Should New York LLC law limit itself to basic contract rules, or are
there more important regulatory issues at stake? Perhaps the time has
come for the legislature to consider these questions more carefully in
the specific context of an LLC.
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